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Derrick A. Bell, Jr.t
"Nobody can free us but ourselves" is the wise but unsettling advice
that New York black activist Preston Wilcox used to chalk on Harlem's
walls and sidewalks. In June 1981, the admonishment made motto was
printed in black letters on a bright, yellow tee shirt that the lawyers and
judges who had participated in my month-long civil rights seminar
presented to me as a parting gift. Evidently, I had cited the Preston Wil-
cox slogan more than I realized during that first summer of President
Reagan's revealed determination to reverse a quarter of a century's civil
rights gains made through court orders and legislative programs.
After all, the commitment, courage, and sacrifice of black people
spurred governmental entities to verify in law what blacks had long
known: that the many dimensions of segregation and discrimination were
uniform in their denial of black rights. Would those tardily recognized
rights have been made more real, or have set more permanently, had
blacks relied more on their ability to organize protests and boycotts rather
than on simply petitioning for desegregation decrees and legislative
mandates?
Survivors of the 1960's civil rights movement will find little insight on
this issue in Jack Bass' Unlikely Heroes. The book is described on its dust
cover as: "The dramatic story of the Southern judges of the Fifth Circuit
who translated the Supreme Court's Brown decision into a revolution for
equality." But for me, the Wilcox self-help exhortation, "Nobody can free
us but ourselves," provided a much-needed contemporary theme for a
book that otherwise is little more than a testimonial to the judicial careers
of a half-dozen district and appeals court judges. Despite its praiseworthy
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subjects and the author's honorable intentions, Unlikely Heroes seldom
rises above the respectfully anecdotal. Published more than a decade after
most of the events it describes took place, I expected more than a homily
on a period rich in racial drama and in fertile expectations so prematurely
turned barren.
At the least, I hoped that Bass would recognize that, given the system-
atic dismantling of their decisions, the unlikely heroes portrayed in his
book may be destined to become tragic figures, victims along with racial
minorities of powerful and pervasive majoritarian racial preferences. Un-
written, but no less controlling, these permanently vested preferences for
whites over blacks slowly but surely will overturn all civil rights laws not
eventually brought into conformity with the society's racial norm.
I
Given the out-of-fashion state of civil rights concerns, one wonders
what motivations prompted a major publishing house to publish a book
about racial issues. In recent years, even the awesome legitimating force of
a white author has not succeeded in getting more than a token number of
civil rights books through the publishing process.' Whatever the trade's
reasons for issuing this book, and however transient the judicial deeds it
hails, the annals of American law contain few counterparts to this handful
of federal judges actually willing to do what they were being paid to do in
cases involving black rights. Their activities deserve recording even if Un-
likely Heroes perpetuates the country's tendency to embrace as miraculous
the treatment of blacks by whites that the law requires.
Of course, as the author reports, Unlikely Heroes is not the premiere,
book-length presentation of the Fifth Circuit during the era when that
court was dominated by Judges Richard Rives, Elbert P. Tuttle, John
Minor Wisdom, and John R. Brown.2 Nor is it the first book to focus on
the exploits in civil rights enforcement of District Court Judges Skelly
Wright of Louisiana and Frank Johnson of Alabama.3
Nevertheless, to the extent there is interest in or curiosity about South-
ern federal judges who accepted opprobrium from their communities and
1. To the extent that Unlikely Heroes can be deemed history, it falls within the exception to
contemporary publisher disinterest in nonfiction books on racial subjects. See, e.g., G. FREDRICKSON,
WHITE SUPREMACY (1981) (Oxford University Press); V. HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER (1981) (Har-
court Brace Jovanovitch) (history of the black freedom struggle from slavery through 1965); J. RAW.
LEY, THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: A HISTORY (1981) (W.W. Norton); W. ROSE, SLAVERY
AND FREEDOM (1982) (Oxford University Press).
2. See J. POLTASON, 58 LONELY MEN (1961); F. READ & L. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED
(1978).
3. See R. KENNEDY, JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (1978); T. YARBROUGH,
JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA (1981).
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ostracism from their peers, and endured a constant stream of abusive
phone calls interspersed with threats of violence and sickening acts of van-
dalism by the public, Unlikely Heroes meets the need. Bass writes well, a
talent much needed in a discussion of legal proceedings and judicial opin-
ions that unavoidably will seem too technical for the lay reader and overly
simplistic to the legally trained.
The work of federal judges and their private lives are not usually the
base ingredients for high adventure. Each of those honored in the book
were hard-working and successful lawyers who became judges in recogni-
tion of their professional success and by virtue of their political connec-
tions. They certainly did not foresee controversy and public censure as
part of the judicial challenge they faced. Judge Tuttle, having accepted a
judicial appointment shortly after the Supreme Court's school desegrega-
tion decision in May of 1954, told a friend: "I'm going home to retire on
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals."'4 Both Judges Tuttle and Wisdom
predicted the South would comply with the Brown decision. They proved
far better judges than prognosticators of the region's rebellious response to
the Supreme Court's long-delayed acknowledgement that "separate but
equal" was no longer an acceptable interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection of the laws guarantee.
To dramatize the pre-Brown climate in the deep South, Bass provides
as prelude to Unlikely Heroes an interview with Constance Baker Mot-
ley, now a federal district judge in New York. Judge Motley recalls her
first trip to Mississippi in 1948 as an NAACP lawyer, and her initial
confrontation with the now famous 40 feet long and 20 feet high planta-
tion mural that stretched across the front of the federal courtroom in
Jackson. The antebellum painting portrayed that mythical period of
Southern history when imperfect memory and unabashed longing com-
bined to create a continuing vision of what many Southerners consider to
be the only real period of racial harmony in American history. The mural
depicts blacks working in the cotton fields and others loading the products
of those fields aboard a paddle-wheeled riverboat while the stereotypical
"happy darky" serenades them on a banjo, and the white overseer, whip
in hand, surveys the whole reassuring scene.
The federal courthouse mural disturbed and embarrassed white liberals
far more than it did blacks for whom it represented one of the more be-
nign manifestations of the South's racial ethos. Too many other en-
counters with whites in Mississippi posed a far more immediate threat for
blacks. For example, Judge Motley recalls how she and fellow NAACP
attorney Robert C. Carter, now also a Federal district judge in New
4. J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 15 (1981) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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York, were insulted by a grocery clerk in Mississippi. Instinctively, these
highly educated black lawyers from the North knew as firmly as the
poorest Southern black sharecropper that they could not protest even this
casual slight to their dignity without endangering their lives.
Bass then suggests that, in the 1980's, a different and far more civilized
South has emerged. He states without equivocation that the "heroic bank"
of Fifth Circuit judges were primary movers in that change. To support
this claim, Bass begins Chapter 1 with a quotation from reporter Claude
Sitton who in the early 1960's served as the New York Times southern
correspondent. "Those who think Martin Luther King desegregated the
South," proclaims Sitton, "don't know Elbert Tuttle and the record of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals." ' Similar comments are sprinkled liber-
ally throughout the text.
It is certainly permissible in a book intended to confer hero status on its
subjects for the author to quote Yale Law Professor Burke Marshall, who
served as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Divi-
sion during the Kennedy Administration, as stating that Tuttle, Rives,
Wisdom, and Brown made as much of an imprint on American society
and American law as any four judges below the Supreme Court have ever
done on any court.6 But does either Professor Marshall or the author ac-
tually believe that, as Marshall contends further, "If it hadn't been for
judges like that on the Fifth Circuit, I think Brown would have failed in
the end"?7
Approbation of this character strikes an unharmonious chord for me. In
1960, I became an assistant to both Mrs. Motley and Mr. Carter, and
worked for lengthy periods in Mississippi from 1961 to 1966. No one was
more pleased than I to take an appeal to the Fifth Circuit and find one or
more of the Court's liberal judges on the panel. But for all their worth-
while effort, favorable decisions in key cases were no more important than
the leadership of Martin Luther King and dozens of lesser known South-
ern black leaders, particularly the handful of local lawyers who became
identified with the civil rights cause at the expense of their practices and
at the risk of their own and their families' lives.8
Perhaps it was unintentional, but it is unnecessary for Bass to
subordinate the contributions of blacks in order to gain adequate appreci-
ation for these courageous federal judges. Their decisions were welcome
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blacks during the 1960's and 1970's, and their efforts to keep faith with
the original understanding of the Brown decision may prove in the light of
still unfolding events to have effected change that was both less substan-
tive and less permanent than any of us believed during the exciting era
this book records.
The author's decision not to come to grips with this unhappy epilogue
of the Unlikely Heroes' work may also explain the nagging dissatisfaction
with the book that I share with the New York Sunday Times reviewer,
who faulted it because "it lacks a clear vision of how to reconstruct this
history and relate the experience of regional strife to the shaping of fed-
eral law." 9 It is one thing to review the tremendous developments in civil
rights law that happened ten to twenty years ago. It is another to tell that
story as though the hopes and expectations of that legal struggle have been
realized.
The Fifth Circuit did give blacks and their lawyers hope-as Carsie
Hall, one of Mississippi's first black attorneys, said 1°-but it was the hope
that the courts would both grant and protect rights for blacks based on the
latter's entitlement to them. Those hopes have fallen far short of expecta-
tions, and even rights that were judicially recognized in the past are now
under concerted and continuing attack on all fronts, from the White
House to the smallest Southern precinct.
To be sure, a great and courageous effort to bring justice to those from
whom it has been withheld too long is not diminished because in the end
it failed to attain all of its goals. Nor is the contribution of these judges
less worthy because the black beneficiaries of their efforts contributed to
the crusade. Bass seems to recognize this fact toward the end of Unlikely
Heroes. He acknowledges that skilled and committed lawyers were neces-
sary to bring to the Fifth Circuit the issues that the Court used to expand
and reshape legal and constitutional principles," and he quotes Judge
Tuttle who had told him, "We became what I consider a great constitu-
tional court, . and I think we largely have to thank the black plaintiffs
for that."'12
It did become a great constitutional court, but as the current declining
status of civil rights precedent reflects, not great enough to deliver a mor-
tal blow to the region's commitment to keep black people down. The Jus-
tice Department's John Doar, who traveled the South extensively in the
1960's, reports that he soon "began to appreciate the relentless determina-
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tion of white people to maintain the caste system." 1 3 But, two decades
after Doar's discovery of what blacks had known and labored under for a
century, it is clear that the pro-civil rights decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit, and other federal courts have deflected
rather than defeated the racist motives that underlay both slavery and the
separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.1 4 If there is a more
optimistic explanation for why civil rights precedents established through
the expenditure of so much sacrifice have proven incapable of effecting
more than a temporary relaxation in the society's traditional racial order-
ing, Unlikely Heroes does not provide it.
II
Criticism of what might have been done with Unlikely Heroes should
not diminish its accomplishment as a worthwhile record of an historic pe-
riod. Although it lacks an analysis of why so committed a judicial effort
failed to bring us closer to the ultimate resolution of America's racial di-
lemma, the book does offer insights at a less ambitious level that can en-
lighten contemporary race relations workers.
Of special interest is the interesting similarity in backgrounds of the
judges whose work this book hails. Prior to their appointments, each of
the four Fifth Circuit judges had been involved in pre-judicial "liberal"
activities, or had undergone consciousness-raising racial experiences.
Judge Richard Rives, a deeply religious Alabamian, is a graduate of
Exeter and Harvard. The book depicts several consciousness-raising racial
experiences during his youth. As a young lawyer, he recalled his shock
when a jury awarded him only $1,000 for the estate of a pregnant black
woman killed and almost decapitated in a fall down an elevator shaft that
lacked a guard rail. During World War II, Judge Rives served as a lieu-
tenant in the Pacific. Forced to spend several weeks in a hospital recover-
ing from a serious illness with black servicemen on either side of him, he
developed strong feelings about racial injustice and determined to work for
change. At his son's suggestion, Rives read An American Dilemma, Gun-
nar Myrdal's major study on race relations published in 1944.
Judge Elbert Tuttle was born and grew up in Hawaii, attended a
multi-racial school, and moved to Atlanta after graduating from Cornell
Law School. He built a successful practice and became active in civic ac-
tivities, including service as a member of the Board of Trustees at More-
house College, a private black college in Atlanta. In the 1930's, Tuttle, a
13. P. 268.
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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National Guard major, commanded a unit that prevented a mob from
lynching John Downer, a black accused of raping a white woman. After
Downer's conviction, Tuttle was asked by Austin T. Walden, one of the
few black attorneys in the South at that time, to help with an appeal.
Tuttle agreed, and they obtained a reversal of the conviction and a new
trial. Downer was again convicted and eventually executed despite Tut-
tle's effort to gain a stay to investigate new evidence that the black man
may have been a scapegoat the complainant used to explain to her parents
indications on her clothing of sexual intercourse that may have occurred
when she surrendered her virginity to her boyfriend.
Later, Tuttle represented a black Communist, possibly the only defen-
dant in the South less likely to receive a fair trial than a black charged
with the rape of a white woman. Angelo Herndon had been convicted of
attempting to incite insurrection for passing out literature on the Atlanta
Post Office steps that urged Southern blacks to join the American Com-
munist Party. The conviction was upheld on appeal and the defendant,
who could have been sentenced to death under the statute, was given
twenty years at hard labor. Tuttle and his law partner attacked the statute
as unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They
finally prevailed at the Supreme Court by a five to four decision." Tuttle
also served as counsel in Johnson v. Zerbst,6 the landmark case that es-
tablished the right to counsel for every defendant charged with a federal
crime. He had taken this case at the request of the ACLU, and when that
organization ran out of funds, Tuttle personally paid the expenses of an
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Tuttle and John Minor Wisdom, a successful corporate lawyer in New
Orleans, had long been close friends and allies in the effort to reform the
South's reactionary, one-party system. Both worked to elect Dwight Ei-
senhower in 1952, and Wisdom, declining nomination to the Fifth Circuit
himself in 1954, recommended Tuttle for the post. Three years later,
when a Louisiana vacancy occurred on the Fifth Circuit, Eisenhower per-
sonally selected Wisdom.
Judge Wisdom is a member of an exclusive segment of New Orleans'
genteel aristocracy. He attended Washington and Lee College, spent a
year as a graduate student in English at Harvard, and then returned
home to attend Tulane's Law School. Wisdom served as a board member
of the New Orleans Urban League, had been President of the New Orle-
ans Council of Social Agencies, and had been a member of the President's
Committee on Government Contracts.
15. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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Judge John Brown, a native of Nebraska, went to Texas after finishing
Michigan Law School, and later became a senior partner of a law firm
that specialized in admiralty law. He had not seen racial prejudice grow-
ing up in Nebraska, and recalled his friendship with the only black in his
hometown. Brown, like Tuttle and Wisdom, helped to build a Republican
Party in Texas, and also worked for the election of Eisenhower, who ap-
pointed him to the Fifth Circuit in 1955.
Thus, three of the Fifth Circuit's four liberal judges, as well as District
Judge Frank Johnson, were Republican appointees of President Eisen-
hower, who had received little of the predominantly Democratic black
vote, and whose own record in civil rights left much to be desired.' 7 In
each case, political performance and connections were more important
than professional accomplishments, judicial potential, or civil rights orien-
tation in gaining the nomination.
Certainly any expectation that these appointees would favorably con-
sider civil rights petitions played little part in their nominations. The co-
incidence of a liberal majority on the Fifth Circuit during this crucial
period in the South's racial history was the result of neither political pres-
sures brought by black voters nor a strong commitment by President Ei-
senhower to eliminate racial injustice.'
Predictably, the Eisenhower administration's record of judicial appoint-
ments was not without blemish. Surviving lengthy questioning by Deputy
Attorney General William Rogers, Mississippi attorney Ben Franklin
Cameron received, at age sixty-four, an appointment to the Fifth Circuit
in 1955. Cameron was a member of neither the Citizens Council move-
ment nor other secret groups involved in racial matters; Eisenhower
deemed him a most unusual judicial nominee because, as he told Cam-
eron, "You have the endorsement of both Senator Eastland and the
NAACP." 9
But Cameron was an ardent believer in state's rights, and as Bass accu-
rately assessed his position, "He never accepted Brown as based on legal
precept, and from the beginning he positioned himself on the court as
stalwart defender of a way of life that was dying. °20 Bass records in gos-
sipy detail the resulting clashes, private as well as public, between Cam-
eron and the Fifth Circuit's liberal wing,2' to whom Judge Cameron re-
17. Both Judge Rives and Judge Skelly Wright were appointed by President Harry Truman.
18. Bass does report that Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, a Wall Street lawyer
with a strong background in liberal Republican politics, possessed a quiet commitment to civil rights
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ferred in one of his bitter dissents as "The Four."22
Against a background of liberal Republican judicial appointments by
fortuitous circumstance, it is interesting to compare the judicial selections
of President John F. Kennedy, who received decisive support from black
voters. In signing the Omnibus Judgeship Act in May 1961, President
Kennedy promised to fill the seventy-one new positions with individuals
possessing "professional skill, incorruptible character, firm judicial tem-
perament, the rare inner quality to know when to temper justice with
mercy, and the intellectual capacity to protect and illuminate the Consti-
tution and our historic values ... "23
Unhappily, President Kennedy felt he had to observe the Senate's cour-
tesy system regarding judicial appointments. Thus, because of the opposi-
tion of Louisiana's senators, he failed to promote district Judge Skelly
Wright to the Fifth Circuit despite Judge Tuttle's strong plea that "We
need him. He'd be a great boost to those of us on the Fifth Circuit.2 The
two Fifth Circuit vacancies the Omnibus Judgeship Act created went to
Griffin Bell in Georgia and Walter Gewin in Alabama. Neither were
rigid segregationists, but both were far from progressive on civil rights
issues.
The Kennedy administration filled the seat Skelly Wright vacated 5 by
appointing Frank Ellis, a conservative who had proven incompetent in the
government job he received after serving as Kennedy's Louisiana state
campaign manager. Ellis, who promptly diluted Judge Wright's New Or-
leans' school desegregation plan, was, according to one Kennedy official,
"the only appointment we knew was bad when we made it."26
This is a telling admission given the high standards Kennedy promised
in his judicial selections. Kennedy's abject surrender of these standards
under pressure from Mississippi's Senator James Eastland and other
Southern conservatives led to the approval of Harold W. Cox in Missis-
sippi, E. Gordon West in Louisiana, and Robert Elliott in Georgia. Cox,
equally famous for his racist comments from the bench as for his predict-
able rejection of all civil rights petitions placed before him, was appointed,
22. P. 231. Dissenting in Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 353 n.1 (5th Cir. 1963),
Judge Cameron cited a newspaper article indicating that Rives, Tuttle, Wisdom, and Brown had
stood together consistently in decisions on civil rights cases, and proclaimed, "These four Judges will
hereafter sometimes be referred to as The Four." Cameron charged Chief Judge Tuttle with rigging
the three-judge panels in civil rights cases to achieve a desired result by assigning panels "composed of
some combination of The Four .... " Pp. 235-36.
23. P. 155.
24. P. 156. Deputy Attorney General Byron White called Judge Wright to convey personally his
regrets that he had been unable to win approval from Louisiana's senators for the appointment.
25. A few months after the appointment of Frank Ellis, Wright was named to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. This action, Bass notes, recognized Wright's performance and
pleased Southern senators by removing him from the South. Id.
26. P. 171.
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despite suspicions that Senator Eastland's strong support for him raised,
because he assured Robert Kennedy that he would enforce the Constitu-
tion as interpreted by the Supreme Court.27
Judge West ignored civil rights precedent, and once revealed his deter-
mination not to follow the Brown decision by characterizing it in a judi-
cial opinion as "one of the truly regrettable decisions of all time .... 1-21
But West, who denounced desegregation efforts from the bench as Com-
munist-inspired, was not a more committed segregationist than Judge
Robert Elliott, whose reversal rate in civil rights cases was 90% during
Robert Kennedy's tour as Attorney General. 9 Later, Bass reports, the
Kennedys learned that it wasn't necessary to accept poor recommendations
from Southern senators. More moderate appointments followed, including
Lewis Morgan in Georgia, Robert Ainsworth in Louisiana, and William
McRae in Florida.
But was there a message in the Kennedy administration's "slow read"
of Southern segregationsist sympathies? Why did the quite real debt owed
to black voters not prevail over the administration's sense of responsibility
to Southern campaign officials and senatorial customs long used to pre-
serve the South's stranglehold on black rights? Here was an opportunity
to enhance efforts by blacks to seek in federal court protection of constitu-
tional rights neither the executive nor legislative branches had been will-
ing to provide. The administration tried to further this end, yet the effort
was so puny as to make one question whether the Kennedy appointments
would have been any worse from a civil rights standpoint had blacks voted
overwhelmingly Republican in the 1960 presidential election.
The Kennedy experience provides the basis for at least an argument
that black political support for a successful national candidate does not
translate into guaranteed support for even basic black needs. Although
there is little evidence that the Kennedy administration felt no obligation
to blacks, the priority assigned to black interests, given society's commit-
ment to resist real civil rights reform, was simply inadequate. Explaining
why the Kennedy administration had been unwilling to fight for his nomi-
nation to the Fifth Circuit, Skelly Wright told Bass, "Politically, they
needed some votes in the Senate. And that was the'end of it."3 To be
27. P. 165. Kennedy later admitted that Cox had misled him. The NAACP's Roy Wilkins
warned at the time of Cox's appointment that for Mississippi's million Negroes, Judge Cox "will be
another strand in their barbed wire fence, another cross over their weary shoulders and another rock
in the road up which their young people must struggle." P. 166.
28. P. 169.
29. In 1952, Elliott, then a floor leader in the Georgia legislature, had declared "I don't want
these pinks, radicals and black voters to outvote those who are trying to preserve our segregation laws
and traditions." P. 169.
30. P. 156.
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sure, some decisions presented difficult dilemmas. Kennedy may have
feared, for example, that unless he capitulated to Eastland's demand that
Judge Cox be appointed to the district court in Mississippi, Eastland's
Judiciary Committee would never approve NAACP chief counsel
Thurgood Marshall's appointment to the Second Circuit.3 '
Politics is compromise, and judicial appointments are the fine edge of
politics. Kennedy viewed himself as a politician. Despite his debt to black
voters and his genuine concern for their plight, he did not view as politic
the all out risk required to appoint federal judges who had themselves
risked their legal careers in defense of the civil rights cause.
Unswerving opposition to racism in this country requires both courage
and, for those involved in or responsive to the political process, a willing-
ness to pay a price. As the Skelly Wright experience revealed, a strong
civil rights record can prove a barrier to professional advancement that the
political strength of blacks is inadequate to overcome. By a mammoth ef-
fort during the Nixon administration, civil rights adherents did manage to
scuttle the appointments of Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell;
but Bass also tells us that when a moderate Republican governor sug-
gested Judge Wisdom's name to Attorney General John Mitchell, the re-
sponse reportedly was, "He's a damn left winger. . .. He'd be as bad as
Earl Warren. 3 2 Tuttle wrote to Mitchell protesting the statement, and
Mitchell in his reply denied making it, but no serious consideration was
given to Wisdom's elevation to the Supreme Court.
While the outlook of these judges on racial issues was too forthright for
much of the country, some aspects of their lives might give pause to the
purists among integration proponents. Judge Rives, active in state politics,
had attended a few meetings of the Ku Klux Klan after World War I.
While, unlike his friend and mentor Justice Hugo Black, Rives had not
joined the Klan, he has candidly admitted that he had not always been
"pure on this question of bigotry. . . ."' He had once advised the Mont-
gomery Board of Registrars on how to thwart an early registration drive
by blacks; in the early 1930's, he was involved in a case seeking the dis-
barment of Arthur Shores, one of Alabama's first black lawyers, for alleg-
edly soliciting a case of a black woman who was trying to vote. Both
events occurred, Rives reportedly said, "before he developed a real under-
standing of the racial situation."34 Certainly, his record on the court pro-
vides impressive proof that he learned much over the years.
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dom, perhaps the most militant and most outspoken of the Fifth Circuit's
liberal wing, has retained his associations in exclusive private clubs and
Mardi Gras crewes that discriminate against blacks and Jews. In explain-
ing the seeming paradox of his behavior to Bass, Wisdom said: "The peo-
ple I see in these clubs are guys that I went to school with and have
known all my life. I would not resign from any such dub. I think that my
private life and people I go with is my own. They know how I stand on
these matters .... I certainly wouldn't change their views by getting out
of the club.""
It is not clear what response to Wisdom's statement will be made by
proponents of an amendment to the American Bar Association's Code of
Judicial Conduct requiring judges to resign from private clubs with ad-
mission rules that discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and religion. 6
While those who urge adoption of the amendment contend that minorities
and women are entitled to have their cases heard by judges whose impar-
tiality is not placed in question by their association with organizations
that invidiously exclude members of these groups, what can be said to a
judge like Wisdom whose actual performance in civil rights cases over two
decades entirely rebuts any presumption of bias raised by his associations?
Whatever the answer, the question suggests the importance of a charac-
ter trait all those honored in Unlikely Heroes proudly possess. That trait
is their fierce independence and an almost obsessive willingness to stand
behind unpopular positions, come what may. This quality was needed, for
the South did not lack individuals and groups ready and willing to convey
to liberal judges in the strongest and most threatening terms their
profound disagreement with pro-civil rights decisions. In the face of such
judicial determination, however, these critics would not have been reas-
sured had they known that Judge Rives once gave his assistance to a
scheme to keep blacks from registering to vote, and that Judge Wisdom
has not seen fit to resign from private dubs with bigoted membership
policies. Yet the question remains, in a society in which the customs and
forms of white supremacy are so deep and diverse that even white men
like Judge Rives and Wisdom are not untouched, how can we evolve mea-
sures for identifying others with potential for unselfish service in the cause
of racial justice?
No one familiar with the South's racial etiquette in the pre-Brown
years, or for that matter even during the first decade after Brown, can
35. P. 46.
36. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities." Whether this prohibition should specifically
include membership by a judge in an organization that practices invidious discrimination is discussed
in Bell, Private Clubs and Public Judges: A Non-Substantive Debate About Symbols, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 733 (1981).
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view the region now and find it unchanged. Without citing the chapter
and verse of progress, even a critic would be hard pressed to deny that the
South has caught up and perhaps surpassed the North in both racial ac-
complishments and attitudes.
But neither the antidiscrimination principle of Brown nor the myriad of
civil rights laws and agencies enacted in the wake of that still controversial
decision has brought lasting relief from the societal pain of racism. Now
that the Second Reconstruction is being dismantled, where are the succes-
sors to Rives, Tuttle, Wisdom, Brown, Wright, and Johnson who will
save from imminent destruction the work of thirty years?
It is not beyond hope that so fortuitous a coalition will rise again in the
courts, but it is beyond reason and bordering on cowardice that we should
sit passively and wait for a second miracle. Furthermore, in the 1980's the
challenge of racism will likely take forms that are mostly immune to judi-
cial attack. It is unlikely that prestigious figures, on or off the bench, will
serve as surrogates of pleas for racial equality or as scapegoats for the
multitudes who view white supremacy as essential to the nation's func-
tioning. What those committed to the vision of a nonracist America must
do is less clear than that we must be willing to do it on our own.
"Nobody can free us but ourselves." The very real accomplishments of
these Fifth Circuit judges transform Preston Wilcox's message from
friendly admonition to a most stern warning.
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I. The Grand Tradition
A major difference between civil law and common law systems of juris-
prudence has been the disparate influence exercised on each by judges and
legal scholars. The scholars, we are told, dominate the development of
civil law, while the judges control the evolution of common law. This
description may well approach reality as far as substantive doctrine is
concerned. But it seems that academics have had and still maintain an
edge over judges on the subject of the proper role of courts in our system.
One must begin in 1871 when Dean Langdell, in his Cases on Con-
tracts, declared that law is a science.' A decade later, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, the scholar, demonstrated in The Common Law that law was
not such a science after all. Later on, Dean Pound and Professor Frank-
furter gave body to "sociological jurisprudence." Then a judge, Jerome
Frank, launched "legal realism," but he had professional help from aca-
demics such as Karl Llewellyn. In recent times, we have seen the Legal
Process school, with H.L.A. Hart, Albert Sacks, Herbert Wechsler, Alex-
ander Bickel, Harry Wellington and a fecund generation of disciples. All
have contributed mightily to illuminating the options and charting the
hazards for practicing judges as they engage in the lifelong quest for their
proper role.
There seems to be no slackening in the tide of scholarly writing on the
role of judges. As Judge McGowan points out, however, "the central pre-
occupation" of many leading scholars is not the role of courts generally
but the nature and scope of the role of the United States Supreme Court.2
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
1. A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 174-75 (1967).
2. McGowan, Constitutional Adjudication: Deciding When to Decide, 79 MICH. L. REV. 616
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Two recent offerings are from gifted law teachers on both coasts.
Harvard's (now Stanford's) Ely in Democracy and Distrust would have
the Court husband its prestige and concentrate its efforts on enhancing the
individual's participation or representation in the process of national poli-
cymaking. Berkeley's Choper in Judicial Review and the National Politi-
cal Process' would have the Court stick to protecting individual rights,
and the integrity of its own functioning, and abjure decision of controver-
sies between states and the national government and between the legisla-
tive and executive branches.
Ely and Choper are both primarily concerned with defining the proper
function of the Supreme Court in our society. Each strongly advocates
Court action in those areas deemed most appropriate for constitutional
decisionmaking, and each urges withdrawal from cases not within those
areas. Each also exhibits a concern that the Court not unduly strain citi-
zens' trust in and acceptance of its decisions.
It is only fitting that distinguished Yale Professor Guido Calabresi
should make these new offerings into a trilogy with his new book, which
germinated as the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law
School in 1977. But his is a book with a difference. Although its focus is
how courts should act, it steps down from the Olympian heights of consti-
tutional doctrine and-refreshingly, for this reader-explores an upland
meadow of nonconstitutional adjudication, the problem of outdated stat-
utes and what can be done about them-specifically, what courts should
be permitted to do about them. Reflecting the author's wide-ranging inter-
ests, but also drawing on the rich vineyard of common law learning in
which he nurtured innovative contributions to the theory of tort liability,
the book speaks to all judges, supreme and inferior, state and federal.
II. The Doctrine
Although Professor Calabresi may have stepped down from the heights
of Olympus and constitutionalism, his horizon has by no means shrunk.
He urges that courts exercise with candor, subject to certain limiting prin-
ciples and guidelines, "the judicial power to force legislative agendas":s to
identify, nullify, and thus require legislative reconsideration of statutes
that are seen to be inconsistent with the circumambient "legal topogra-
phy" of the times. In an epoch when legislators are demonstrating endless
(1981).
3. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
4. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
5. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 20 (1982) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
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ingenuity in proposing ways to limit, hobble and divest courts of jurisdic-
tion over politically controversial matters, the approach appears as a wel-
come, albeit a lonely, reaffirmation of confidence in the judicial process.
The fact that this approach might score low in a current public opinion
poll is beside the point. Like any original thinking, it is bound to be dif-
ferent from the conventional wisdom. It deserves the most serious consid-
eration, untrammeled by tactical or political prejudgments.
Professor Calabresi's book begins with recognition of the societal values
that are his major concern. Next comes his perception of a major threat to
these values, followed by his systematic analysis of the efficacy of existing
protections-all of which are found wanting. Finally comes Professor Cal-
abresi's new doctrine, first justified by defending the capacity of courts to
act in a new role, then refined by discussions of its hazards, limitations,
and techniques of application.
The Values Served. Professor Calabresi views the health of our body
politic as best served by restoring the balance between continuity and
change in the legal system that is said to have prevailed in the nineteenth
century, when stability was fostered by the fact that legislatures made and
revised laws sparingly. Continual but non-convulsive change was provided
by the incremental processes of common law adjudication. Although we
now live in a vastly different world, the goal of Professor Calabresi's ap-
proach is to erect "a modem version of . . .the traditional legislative-
judicial balance, on the asssumption that the aim of such a balance is the
thoughtful allocation of the burden of inertia in a system of checks and
balances which seeks both continuity and change."'
The Problem. The classical balance between continuity and change has
been lost with the onset of the welfare state, economic and other crises,
and the proliferation of legislative responses. We live in an age of stat-
utes.7 These statutes, enacted within a particular social and political con-
text, generally carry the seeds of their own mortality, gradually losing
their relevance and utility as technology and social values change. They
almost inevitably cease to match the legal landscape of pertinent statutes,
case law, and scholarly commentary. The result, to invoke the author's
colorful language, is "statutory petrification." The increasing frequency
with which courts encounter the frustration of anachronistic statutes in
the disposition of cases elevates the problem to one of grave concern:
Hence the Holmes Lectures and this book.
6. P. 82.
7. To describe our current condition in one word is a challenge that might frustrate the Academic
Francaise. Professor Calabresi has chosen "statutorification." One's immediate reaction is that this is
a word that is mercifully soon forgotten. Yet, what is the alternative? "Statutization" has the merit of
being two syllables shorter, but is hardly an ornament to the language.
829'
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The Inadequacy of Present Efforts. Having stated the problem, Profes-
sor Calabresi examines, in six incisive chapters, the existing ways in
which superannuated statutes are dealt with: (1) courts too easily resort to
strained constitutional equal protection analysis to deal with a nonconsti-
tutional statutory problem; (2) even when courts attempt to invoke the
"'passive virtues" by refraining from action in the hope of inducing a legis-
lature to take a second look at a statute, their reasoning and language
partake of a "rhetoric of constitutional dubiety,"8 thus unnecessarily chil-
ling or aborting creative legislative responses; (3) judicial reliance on the
canons and processes of statutory interpretation is unavailing if the statute
is crystal clear; indeed this limitation has led courts to "creat[e] false un-
certainty where it does not exist";9 (4) administrative agencies are too
committed to existing rules, too dependent on legislative committees, and
too parochial in their vision to undertake timely and independent renova-
tion that would carry a conviction of legitimacy; (5) legislative mecha-
nisms such as sunset laws to assure periodic reevaluation and indexing to
keep monetary ceilings in line with inflation substitute rigidity where flex-
ibility and judgment are needed and therefore are excessively burdensome,
ineffective, and inappropriate; (6) radical structural responses-such as
adoption of the European model of making statutory revision and updat-
ing as easy as passing new laws, or returning to a "pure golden age of the
common law"10 by increasing the obstacles to legislative lawmaking-are
not realistic possibilities. In short, Professor Calabresi concludes that the
existing ways of dealing with obsolete statutes are largely disingenuous,
ineffective, and without a sense of limits.
The New Doctrine. The starting point for Professor Calabresi's ap-
proach is to take as the measure of a statute's legitimacy its likely concord
with a contemporary legislative majority. A workable litmus test is the
consistency of the statute with "the legal fabric, and the principles that
form it, [for they are] a good approximation of one aspect of the popular
will, of what a majority in some sense desires."'" Even though society may
in fact currently prefer some action inconsistent with this fabric, "consis-
tency with the legal fabric is an appropriate starting point for lawmak-
ing";' 2 its absence is sufficient to summon a contemporary majority to re-
think the issue.
With this foundation laid, Professor Calabresi points to what judges do
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way, treating like cases alike, to adapt precedents to a current problem. In
defining what a "like" case is, they take into account ideological, techno-
logical, judicial, and even statutory developments. In short, they reach an
outcome consistent with the existing legal fabric. He then adds that there
is no valid reason to limit such judicial scrutiny to previous common law
cases. Statutes (and to a varying degree scholarly criticisms, jury actions,
and even administrative determinations) also "reflect changes in underly-
ing popular attitudes."13 Therefore, courts should have "the power to treat
statutes in precisely the same way that they treat the common law"1'4-by
altering part of a statute, nullifying it, or threatening such actions-and,
by so doing, courts should be able to force the legislative agenda by shift-
ing to the legislature the job of repassing a law if the legislature really
wants it.15
Perhaps the most tightly packed summary of this book is the following,
to which mere paraphrase could only do injustice:
What, then, is the common law function to be exercised by courts
today? It is no more and no less than the critical task of deciding
when a retentionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately applied to
an existing statutory or common law rule. It is the judgmental func-
tion (which cannot successfully be accomplished by sunset laws or
automatic updatings) of deciding when a rule has come to be suffi-
ciently out of phase with the whole legal framework so that,
whatever its age, it can only stand if a current majoritarian or repre-
sentative body reaffirms it. It is to be the allocator of that burden of
inertia which our system of separation of powers and checks and
balances mandates. It is to assign the task of overcoming inertia to
that interest, whose desires do not conform with the fabric of the
law, and hence whose wishes can only be recognized if current and
clear majoritarian support exists for them. It is this task (so like that
exercised by courts in updating the common law) which desperately
needs doing in a checked and balanced statutory world like ours, and
it can be done by courts using traditional judicial methods and modes
of reasoning. 6
The new doctrine thus arrived at, Professor Calabresi devotes labor and
learning to anchoring it in the mainstream of thinking about the role of
courts. He identifies limits on the proper use of his doctrine, indicates the
range of techniques available in applying it, and discusses whether it




16. P. 164 (emphasis in original).
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the discussion of the limits of this doctrine and questions as to its applica-
tion to the readers of the book, observing only that much prudential wis-
dom and sensitivity are reflected. My own reflections range from doubts
about the book's underlying premises and the extent and seriousness of the
problems raised, to speculation as to the workability of his doctrine in the
hands of judges, and the existence of more viable alternative solutions.
III. The Theory And Its Fit With Our Scheme of Things
As an introduction to his doctrine, Professor Calabresi, in a familiar
common law way, takes pains to show that he is rowing in the main-
stream of tradition. It is no surprise that Landis is recognized as an im-
portant progenitor. In his seminal Statutes and the Sources of Law,"
Landis's discussion of the "gravitational pull" that statutes exert on
courts' common law decisions is really the obverse side of Calabresi's doc-
trine, which would subject statutes to judges' common law lenses. Profes-
sor Calabresi also seeks to identify supporting resonances in the writings
of Chief Justice Stone, Chief Justice Traynor, and Judge Henry
Friendly. Quite unexpectedly, support is said to come from the Harvard
Legal Process School, by reason of "[i]ts open recognition that courts not
only make law but that they also do and should update statutes."1
I doubt that Professor Calabresi's doctrine can claim any meaningful
descent from these sources, or that, even if it could, any real luster would
be added. The fact that others may have foreshadowed one's thought or
that others have been on the same wavelength is interesting, but unimpor-
tant in the assay of it. In its present forthright form, the doctrine is genu-
inely new, not derivative; it therefore deserves judgment on its merits, not
on its possible antecedents.
A threshold question to test one's perspective is whether the judicial
review of statutes for anachronism is an anachorism. In plainer language,
is judicial review of statutes for being out of date out of place in our
political system?
The underlying defense for this form of judicial review is that statutes
are not inherently different from common law rules and that statutes can
easily be subjected to the principled, incremental, and conditional assess-
ments that our democratic society has entrusted to courts in developing
and updating common law. In one sense, I share the author's view that
the distinctions between statutory and common law adjudication are mini-
17. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
18. P. 88.
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mal.19 Indeed, while we live in a time of government by statute, I do not
see that courts are being called on to act in any essentially different way
than when the grist for their mill had more of a common law origin. The
courts' task is still to fill gaps, to adapt general mandates or precepts to
special and unforeseen situations, to devise substantive and procedural
safeguards, prerequisites, caveats, and balancing tests, to allocate and de-
fine burdens, to articulate standards of review, and to decide innummer-
able other interstitial details. Even though a large chunk of my work as a
federal judge centers around one statute, 41 U.S.C. § 1983, I feel very
much like a common law judge when deciding such issues as "color of
state law," nature of property or liberty right, extent of process due, exis-
tence of qualified or absolute immunity, and subjective and objective tests
of knowledge of constitutional violations.
Yet, as Professor Calabresi acknowledges, "[j]udges have been taught to
honor legislative supremacy and to leave untouched all constitutionally
valid statutes."20 Is there anything more to this teaching than mere tradi-
tion? The answer is not a simple one. It is not predetermined by measur-
ing judicial oversight of statutes against absolute majoritarian or demo-
cratic theory. After all, purely majoritarian values are difficult to reconcile
with judicial common law making and gap filling, not to mention constitu-
tional review of statutes. I prefer to consider our governmental structure,
both state and federal, for want of a better word, "mixed"; 21 its genius is
not ideological purity but its pragmatic combination of powers and rights
distributed among the branches as well as among minorities, individuals,
and the current majority. Yet, despite the difficulty of finding bright lines
in such a complex governmental scheme, the special nature of written
laws enacted by a (usually) bicameral legislature and signed by an execu-
tive seems at first blush to be basic. Immediate frustration by executive
action is carefully regulated by veto provisions. The processes of repeal
and amendment are also carefully regulated by legislative ground rules
and provisions for popular initiative and referendum. In sum, it seems
that a very high burden rests on one who would accord the judiciary a
new albeit non-final power to nullify the statutes that are the ultimate
product of agreement between the legislative and executive branches.
19. The distinction, such as it is, has been described as follows:
The difference between 'common law' and 'statutory interpretation' is a difference in emphasis
rather than a difference in kind. The more definite and explicit the prevailing legislative pol-
icy, the more likely a court will describe its lawmaking as statutory interpretation; the less
precise and less explicit the perceived legislative policy, the more likely a court will speak of
common law. The distinction, however, is entirely one of degree.
Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity? 78 MICH. L. REV.
311, 332 (1980).
20. P. 6.
21. F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 216 (1980).
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To be sure, even before Marbury v. Madison,2 2 courts exercised a
power to strike down legislation if it offended a "higher law," that is, a
constitution. But to countenance a judicial power to strike down a statute
merely for lack of fit with something less than such higher law requires a
new perspective. This Professor Calabresi endeavors to give us. He em-
phasizes that his primary aim is to force "legislatures to face up to their
majoritarian responsibilities," 2' and that such a goal "serves precisely to
maintain the balance between the traditional court role of keeping the
fabric of the law consistent and up to date and the legislative role of re-
versing judicial misperceptions of majoritarian demands. 24 The author
dismisses any constitutional objection to his scheme by observing that an
explicit delegation of such power to courts would not diminish the legisla-
ture's ultimate responsibility. Professor Calabresi does not directly discuss
the constitutional problems raised by courts taking on the power of re-
viewing statutes for obsolescence without an explicit delegation. But, hav-
ing satisfied himself that such an explicit delegation would be constitu-
tionally permissible, he is confident that even if courts proceed without
such delegation, "our constitutions will not stand in the way. 2 Nor, he
feels, would either legislatures or courts be impeded in their basic
functions.
Passing any constitutional problems, I wonder about the "fit" of all this
with our scheme of things. In other words, even assuming that a legisla-
ture could tell the courts to carry out Professor Calabresi's doctrine, I
wonder if it should. Courts in the hey-day of common law rules were not
notoriously energetic about updating. Sometimes centuries passed without
more than glacial movement. The dominant values of certainty, stability,
and predictability that were served then are equally important now. Fur-
thermore, the laws on the books of the states and the nation are heavily
encrusted palimpsests of the hard-won victories of many, many different
majorities over the past decades and centuries. It is hard to imagine that
the validity of the current accretion of statutes should depend on whether
they would be theoretically voted in today by tens of thousands of succes-
sive computerized roll calls.2' In any case, even though the power of courts
to force a legislative reconsideration is merely a non-final burden shifting




26. The antipodal view is that of Edmund Burke, as summarized by Professor Bickel:
The people, as Burke used the term, was a body in place, gathered, led, manifesting its
temper in many ways and over a span of time as a whole, or as one or another sizable commu-
nity within the whole body, not speaking merely on occasion in momentary numerical
majorities.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 17-18 (1975).
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in theory, realistically it would often be the power to nullify statutes
finally or for lengthy periods, depending on the amount of legislative in-
terest, time and energy needed to secure repassage. In short, the capacity
to force agendas must not be taken lightly-it is a considerable power.
One might even, perhaps unfairly, push Professor Calabresi's doctrine to
its logical extreme and imagine courts sizing up the landscape, discerning
an unfilled need, and promulgating a new and consistent rule, a judicial
statute, which the legislature could of course nullify.
Professor Calabresi's confidence in the critical abilities of judges in "ex-
ploring and mapping the legal landscape"27 does not seem to have been
notably shared by the Founding Fathers. A lineal ancestor of the doctrine
of judicial scrutiny for "statutory petrification" was the idea that judges
should evaluate brand new statutes. A proposal for a Council of Revision
contemplated that the Supreme Court would be "associated with the Ex-
ecutive in the Revisionary power. '28 James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, in
advocating such a Council, commented that although "judges, as exposi-
tors of the Laws would [under other provisions] have an opportunity of
defending their constitutional rights[,]. . . the power of the judges did not
go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous,
may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the
judges in refusing to give them effect. ' 29 Madison seconded the motion.
Ellsworth chimed in, saying that judges "will possess a systematic and
accurate knowledge of the laws, which the Executive cannot be expected
always to possess."30 Madison added that the motion "would be useful to
the legislature by the valuable assistance it would give in preserving a
consistency, conciseness, perspicuity and technical propriety in the laws,
qualities peculiarly necessary; and yet shamefully wanting in our republi-
can codes."31
Luther Martin, shrewd lawyer of erratic brilliance and influence,
seemed to put the quietus on the proposal:
A knowledge of mankind, and of legislative affairs cannot be pre-
sumed to belong in a higher degree to the judges than to the legisla-
ture. And as to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come
before the judges in their proper official character. In this character
they have a negative in the laws. Join them with the Executive in
The Revision and they will have a double negative. 2
27. P. 97.
28. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 74.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 76.
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The motion was then defeated, as it was on later occasions. Granted, the
idea was not precisely that of updating, but it did involve a remarkably
similar appeal to judges' ability in "preserving a consistency."
IV. The Need for New Doctrine
On a theoretical level, then, I am not yet persuaded. Perhaps this is
because I do not share Professor Calabresi's sense of the magnitude of this
problem. Most federal statutes that I encounter seem reasonably current;
our problem, of course, is not generally with the old ones but with the
remorseless tide of new laws. I suspect, however, that statutory petrifica-
tion may pose a somewhat larger problem for state courts.3 3 Professor
Calabresi suggests that the problem is "frequently (what used to be
called) one of private law"; 34 if so, this would point to a greater incidence
in state courts. But how much greater?
Throughout the book there are examples of judicial efforts to deal with
anachronistic statutes. In a number of instances Professor Calabresi ar-
gues that better results would have been possible if these efforts had been
couched in terms of his new doctrine. But I am not convinced that the
problem is faced very often or that the approaches actually taken are usu-
ally inappropriate .3  For example, in Chapter II, which treats the overu-
33. Indeed, examples from my own experience that readily come to mind are diversity cases in-
volving possibly antiquated state court announced rules, where the first circuit certified the question of
law to the state court. See, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly, 556 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1977) and Raymond v.
Eli Lilly, 117 N.H. 164 (1977) (time of accrual of cause of action for ingestion of drugs is time of
discovery); D'Ambra v. United States, 518 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1975) and D'Ambra v. United States,
144 R.I. 643 (1975) (non-impact associated mental and emotional harm suffered by mother in wit-
nessing death of child can be basis for cause of action); Hendrickson v. Sears, 495 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.
1974) and Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83 (1974) (time of accrual of cause of action for legal
malpractice is time of discovery of title defect). In all these cases the state court revised its own law in
accordance with current trends in case law.
34. P. 16.
35. My comments on the magnitude of the problem posed by statutory petrification are limited to
the cases mentioned in the book. But Professor Calabresi generously identifies and gives credit to the
two other scholars who have independently navigated these waters, Minnesota Senator (and Professor)
Jack Davies and former Yale Professor Grant Gilmore.
Senator Davies' article, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4
VT. L. REV. 203 (1979), describes his legislative proposal, which would, after a statute in a "private
law" field has aged twenty years without significant amendment, allow courts to modify and overrule
it as they modify and overrule common law precedents. Senator Davies relies on GRANT GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977), as having adequately demonstrated that "statutory obsolescence
creates serious problems." Davies, supra, at 203-04 n.5.
Professor Gilmore, his interest sparked by Supreme Court nullification of the exclusive (if obsolete)
liability provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in the 1950's and
1960's, see GILMORE, supra, at 143-44 n. 58, foresees that "we will come to see that the reformulation
of an obsolete statutory provision is quite as legitimately within judicial competence as the reformula-
tion of an obsolete common law rule." Id. at 97.
Nowhere, however, do these authors attempt to canvass contemporary court decisions to ascertain
how frequently the problem is significantly encountered.
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tilization of equal protection clauses to deal with superannuated statutes, I
see references to only three cases,36 and a bald statement that a significant
part of the recent increase in equal protection adjudication is "related to
the problem of statutory obsolescence," 7 the latter principally supported
by an unpublished student paper describing such adjudication in one
state.3"
The suggestion that there has been constitutional overkill in dealing
with obsolete statutes when a milder approach would have been prefera-
ble is illustrated by a discussion of whether Judge Newman, in the three-
judge court decision in Abele v. Markle,3" could more fruitfully have dealt
with a Connecticut statute barring abortions if his rationale had frankly
been a nonconstitutional one that allowed a colloquy with the legislature.
Both the opinion for the court and Judge Newman's concurring view 0
precluded the legislature from concluding that the original purpose of the
statute-protecting the health of pregnant women-was no longer valid.
Moving over the difficulty, recognized by the author,41 of a federal court
making any credible threat of nullifying a state statute on nonconstitu-
tional grounds, I am still unsure that the passive virtues have frequently
become vices in the cause of updating.
The same point can be made regarding the alleged abuses of statutory
interpretation. We are told that one function of interpretation, "as Keeton
and many recent court decisions have demonstrated, is the updating of
laws, the avoidance of the 'legislative deep freeze.' ,,42 Here, as elsewhere,
the examples of what happened and what might have happened amply
illustrate what Professor Calabresi means. But when he writes, "I have
said enough to indicate why I believe the problem of legal obsolescence is
a serious one, why simply living with anachronistic statutes is not really
an option,"4 3 I am not as ready as I wish I were to join him in this
assessment.
44
36. The cases are Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where nullification for lack of fit
would arguably have been more satisfactory than invoking six constitutional amendments; California
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), where Justice Stevens' concurrence is said to have approached the
new doctrine; and Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973), in which
the California Supreme Court invalidated a statute limiting the liability of car owners to guests.
37. P. 13.
38. P. 194 n.25.
39. 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972).
40. The author misspeaks in referring to the decision as Judge Newman's, perhaps because it was
his concurring opinion that contained a thorough historical review of the purposes sought to be ad-
vanced by the state's abortion statute. In fact, judge Lumbard wrote for the court. Judge Clairie,
completing the triumvirate, dissented.
41. P. 201 n.43.
42. P. 32.
43. P. 110.
44. Near the end of the book we find a similar quantitative conclusion that may factually be true
but, so far as the references reveal, deserve the Scotch verdict, "not proven":
The Yale Law Journal
V. Workability Questions
Another range of questions comes into focus when we ignore for a mo-
ment doubts regarding the validity and necessity of the new doctrine and
ask ourselves whether the doctrine is workable. The threshold question
involves what Professor Calabresi terms the traditional judicial task of dis-
cerning the legal landscape or topography. This landscape is "an accept-
able starting point [for determining when legislative reconsideration of
statutes should take place], because it reflects underlying values of a
people.""5
When I contemplate what is embraced in the term "legal landscape," I
am struck by its capaciousness. Here is a fair summary of that landscape:
Statutes, no less than the common law decisions, reflect changes in
underlying popular attitudes. The gravitational force of such statutes
should surely affect courts seeking to keep their map current. Nor
should the input be limited to statutes. Scholarly criticisms (both in
law and derived from such related fields as philosophy, economics,
and political science), jury actions that nullify or mitigate past rules,
even administrative determinations, all can be appropriate reports of
changes in the landscape in response to changed beliefs or
conditions.46
I recognize that a judicial perspective approaching this amplitude has in-
formed the very occasional decisions of supreme courts overruling ancient
judicial precedents relating to spousal or charitable immunity, liability for
mental and emotional harm absent impact, contributory negligence, and
other common law doctrines. In other words, courts have used such de-
tailed topographic maps when they have had to scale an Everest. To ex-
pect them to use such maps to monitor thousands of statutes in fifty-one
jurisdictions whenever the fit of those statutes is thrown into issue invites
many tremulous queries from the would-be traveller.
As with other possible objections, Professor Calabresi phrases the in-
quiry as eloquently as a critic could wish:
We have seen the race to use equal protection doctrines to strike down laws that are clearly
constitutionally valid; the use of interpretations that would do honor to even the greatest of
casuists, and the development of passive virtues into devices for a "virulent variety of free-
wheeling interventionism." We have seen, in other words, that the tools at hand are nowhere
near sufficient to the task courts feel pressed to do.
Pp. 170-71.
45. P. 98.
46. P. 98 (footnotes omitted). To the legal landscape may also be added the occasions when "pros-
ecutors use their power to ignore the law." P. 108.
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When we combine all these different sources of law with the fact
that the nation has fifty-one jurisdictions, . . . we may well ask:
What kind of confused landscape, what kind of ragged map, have we
got? Is it realistic to assume that courts are limited at all? Can they
instead-under the guise of seeking to map the landscape or to
weave the fabric of the law-do precisely what they wish, respond-
ing primarily to their own values or to the majorities that selected
them?"7
His answer is that judges are best suited and usually can be trusted to
assess conformity with a complex legal landscape, that they can be criti-
cized if they err, that their lawmaking is incremental, and that legislatures
have the last word.
My own concern, however, is whether the job is manageable. Professor
Calabresi notes that while many states might want to limit the judicial
"updating power" to the highest court of the state, the lower courts could
deal with this problem as they have dealt with "obviously dead" higher
court decisions.48 But shouldn't Professor Calabresi focus for a moment on
the effect his scheme will have on litigants as well as on judges? If a civil
litigant or criminal defendant has the added arrow of "anachronistic stat-
ute" in his quiver, I can see elaborate looseleaf services for "Legal Land-
scape Advocacy," standardized reports of jury verdicts and administrative
determinations, possibly newsletters narrating prosecutors' nolle prose-
quis, an exponential use of computer-assisted research, burgeoning new
specialties, and-this from my parochial viewpoint-vastly expanded
briefs and appendices crammed with statutes of various jurisdictions and
other "topographical" exhibits.
How would an appellate court review a trial judge's ruling? On the one
hand, the very scope of the decision as to "lack of fit" and the inchoate
nature of the data base suggest wide discretion. On the other hand, it
would seem odd to force a legislature to reconsider a long-standing statute
where a reviewing court did not exercise its discretion to the same extent
as the trial court. Yet if litigants are to have a de novo consideration,
appeals will tend to be automatic. In any event, the field is likely to be
fertile, disagreements plentiful among districts, circuits, and lower state
courts, and the resulting caseload for the state supreme courts and the
Supreme Court not inconsiderable. All of these concerns are prudential
and would not be decisive if the need for a new doctrine were truly
health-if not life-threatening, and if no other approaches, singly or col-
lectively, could sufficiently control the problem.
47. P. 99.
48. P. 142.
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VI. Other Approaches
This leads me to my last point. In addition to a modicum of skepticism
as to the magnitude of the problem and the inadequacy of the various
judicial or non-judicial approaches discussed in the book, I wonder also
about alternative techniques. One kind of updating activity that seems to
be constantly bubbling in the legislative cauldrons of the country is the
recasting and renovation of whole bodies of statutory law. Professor Gala-
bresi is skeptical of entrusting renewal to legislative committees that might
generally be reluctant to initiate change, or to separate advisory law re-
form commissions, whose recommendations he fears would be "systemati-
cally ignored." '49 Yet we have recently altered the entire structure of bank-
ruptcy law and we may yet see the culmination of a decade-and-a-half of
efforts to update the federal criminal code. I am not a close observer of
statutory reform efforts in state legislatures, but I suspect that there is
substantial activity. Indeed, one observer reports that since 1960 no fewer
than thirty-four states have enacted substantive revisions of their penal
laws.50
Such efforts are undoubtedly particularistic, somewhat random, and in-
capable of guaranteeing modernity to the entirety of statutory warp and
woof. I also have no doubt that courts in dealing with flesh and blood
cases occasionally have to deal with statutes that time and other factors
have made uncouth. It has, therefore, long seemed to me desirable to insti-
tutionalize the colloquy with the legislature that Professor Calabresi seeks
to stimulate.
My own suggestion is more modest, perhaps too modest to have any
impact. But it seems worth trying. Simply put, each court system, federal
and state, should have a procedure to collate published judicial opinions in
which the reasoning or even dicta indicate that, in the court's view, a
particular statute is hopelessly anachronistic, has problems of constitu-
tional dimension, or has other problems such as lack of drafting precision
and clarity. To winnow out minor or questionable chaff from the wheat of
solid judicial concern, a committee of the judicial conference of the state or
nation might edit and organize the report. The report of such judicial
commentary would then be systematically forwarded to the appropriate
officials or committees of the relevant legislature for their use.
The Federal Judicial Center has offered to perform such a collating
function for the federal judiciary."1 Obviously, shared concern by the judi-
49. P. 64.
50. Obermnaer, It's Time for a New Code, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1982, at 13.
51. See Opinions Seeking Rules Changes Invited, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1982, at 4 (the Center
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ciary and the Congress at high levels will be required to make this mild
avenue of communication an effective device. One might hope that Profes-
sor Calabresi's book would upgrade the priority of such projects by calling
attention to the problems they seek to address.
Conclusion
One finishes this book with the conviction that he has been led into
territory that has not been overplowed. The problem addressed is one that
only a few have recognized in serious commentary. The probing here is so
meticulous and comprehensive that the reader is given a searching exami-
nation of the entire structure of government, with sophisticated judgments
as to the strengths and weaknesses of the several branches. Indeed, there is
a book within a book, for the 118 pages of footnotes are a rich lode of
legal history, leading cases, and literature on various current issues of law
and government. The numerous cases discussed illuminate the options
available to sensitive courts, even apart from the new doctrine of the role
of courts in forcing the reconsideration of petrified statutes. That doctrine
is, through text and narrative footnotes, tightly constructed with every ef-
fort to insulate and weatherstrip for leaks. To the extent that my com-
ments have exhibited skepticism or criticisms, they have been intended to
show the utmost seriousness regarding this advocacy of a new and impor-
tant proposition-in order to stimulate the reading, pondering, and collo-
quy that the book deserves.
will serve as a "clearinghouse" to which judges might send opinions noting "defects or gaps in stat-
utes"; it will channel them to the appropriate committee of the Judicial Conference or the Congress).
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United States Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea. By Ann L.
Hollick. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. xxi, 496.
$32.50 (paper, $15.00).
Jon L. Jacobsont
Ann Hollick is one of those valuable people who occasionally remind
the blind and nearsighted among us that the elephant is not a rope or a
snake or a wall. While her new book focuses primarily on official United
States attitudes towards the law of the sea, she successfully demonstrates
not only that the law of the sea is one large, interconnected animal, but
also that it lives in a jungle with other beasts, all of which are constantly
and rapidly evolving. This is an especially important lesson for those who
are now attempting to assess final-stage developments in the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).1
It is a common opinion nowadays that, from a United States perspec-
tive, the U.N. Conference has failed: that the United States never should
have entered the Conference process, that at least we should have aban-
doned the process long ago, and that it is probably too bad we cannot now
scuttle the whole leaky tub.2 It is, on the other hand, entirely possible to
disagree with that assessment, and I think Hollick's book helps show why.
To be honest, I must admit that Ann Hollick herself seems to share part
of the attitude just described; she appears, in her final chapter, to accept
the basic assumption that the United States is something of a loser in the
U.N. Conference negotiations.3 Yet her book's historical review of chang-
" Professor of Law, University of Oregon
1. The Conference, which technically began its sessions in 1973 but only after several years of
preparation by the General Assembly's Seabed Committee, had nearly succeeded in adopting a com-
prehensive law of the sea treaty by late 1980. The Reagan Administration then placed UNCLOS III
in virtual limbo while it reviewed U.S. national interests in light of the Conference's Draft Treaty.
This year-long policy review was recently completed and, on January 29, 1982, the President an-
nounced that the U.S. would return to the role of active negotiator in the conference session beginning
in March, 1982. White House Press Release (January 29, 1982). The new administration's principal
concerns with the Draft Convention were with the proposed deep seabed mining regime. See infra
note 4.
2. For some justification for this view, see Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking US. Inter-
ests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373 (1978).
3. Much of Ann Hollick's analysis, and especially that section of the final chapter entitled
"United Nations Negotiations," seems to be based on the assumption that the U.S. and other devel-
oped countries would have been happier with customary law developments than with the results of
UNCLOS III. A. HOLLICK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 377-81
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ing United States policies should warn against such judgments, even if a
temporary, narrow focus-especially on the deep seabed 4 -seems to sub-
stantiate the negative attitude.
Although less than 500 pages long, including appendices, the book is
packed with more information than some multi-volume treatises. It is a
pity, still, that many of its topics are not treated at greater length. Never-
theless, the book is an extremely valuable source for anyone interested in
learning about the recent (and ongoing) revolution in the international
law of the sea, with special emphasis on United States roles. It is also
useful for those of us who purport to be close observers of law of the sea
developments; for us it fills gaps, paints backgrounds, and traces connect-
ing threads.
The book is written in Ann Hollick's characteristically clear and excep-
tionally well-organized style. After an overview introduction, she sets to
the task of describing the evolution of United States ocean policy over the
past 40 years or so. Her exposition of the background to the 1945 Tru-
man Proclamations, which marked the beginning of the new directions in
ocean law, is a highlight of the book. This is followed by a chapter on
United States fisheries problems in the immediate post-World War II dec-
ade, including the disputes with Latin American nations claiming 200-
mile offshore zones. A sort of sidebar discussion on the state-federal con-
troversy concerning jurisdiction over the United States continental shelf
resources leads to a lengthy chapter on the First (1958) and Second
(1960) U.N. Conferences on the Law of the Sea. Although the four trea-
(1981) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
4. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON U.N. THIRD CONFER-
ENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA app. I (Comm. Print 1981) (Statement of James L. Malone, Presi-
dent's Special Representative to U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea). Secretary Malone, who has
been acting as head of the U.S. UNCLOS III delegation under President Reagan, has summarized
current U.S. objections to the Draft Convention, nearly all of which are directed at the proposed deep
seabed regime:
[I]n order to meet U.S. interests, the draft treaty would have to be transformed into a docu-
ment which fosters the development of deep seabed mineral resources, avoids monopolization
by the Enterprise [the proposed International Seabed Authority's operating arm], establishes a
system of political governance commensurate with our perception of America's role in interna-
tional affairs, avoids unjustifiable regulatory interference in mineral development, allows free
market principles to operate and is incapable of being amended without U.S. consent. The
draft treaty falls short of meeting those goals.
Speech by James L. Malone, University of Virginia Ocean Policy Forum, Washington, D.C. (Nov.
12, 1981).
Professor John Norton Moore, a former U.S. negotiator in UNCLOS III, has identified three basic
U.S. concerns with the draft treaty in its present form: (1) obstacles to permanent assured access to
seabed minerals by U.S. mining firms; (2) institutional defects in revenue sharing, in the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) voting system, and in the prospective phasing out of private mining through
the device of a future review conference; and (3) mandatory transfer of technology to the ISA's operat-
ing agency, the Enterprise. Moore, Charting a New Course in the Law of the Sea Negotiations, 10
AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 207 (1981) (sixth annual Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture).
Again, the concerns are directed only to the deep seabed regime.
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ties that emerged from these Conferences have been cited as successful
examples of the codification and progressive development of international
law,' Hollick then demonstrates that their essentially backward-looking
provisions were inadequate to cope with technological and international
political developments in the 1960's. That decade saw the old Grotian
order really begin to crumble for the United States and for a world com-
munity now populated by a growing number of developing or Third
World nations. For the United States, the old East-West foreign policy
orientation began to shift towards a North-South alignment. The U.N.
declarations and resolutions declaring the seabed the "common heritage of
mankind"7 set the stage for the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, "the most complex, ambitious multilateral treaty negotiation ever at-
tempted."8 Hollick's chapters on preparations for UNCLOS III and on
the Conference itself, through its (pre-Reagan) 1980 Geneva session, are
must reading for anyone attempting to make sense of that fascinating,
frustrating, complex and grand political experiment. Finally, Hollick's
last chapter-thoughts on 1970's United States ocean policy and her les-
sons for the future-is almost worth the price of the whole book.
Few people, maybe especially those deeply involved in the UNCLOS
III proceedings, have as comprehensive a grasp of those proceedings as
has Ann Hollick. United States Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea
has several lessons for those United States decisionmakers now trying to
make sense of UNCLOS III and to chart future directions. At least a few
of these lessons can be mentioned here.
By tracing United States involvement in ocean law matters from the
1930's down to the near present, Hollick shows us, without a doubt, that
the presently perceived United States "dilemma" 9 regarding the law of the
sea is largely of the United States's own making. The fact is that United
States decisionmakers and their attitudes, as well as the internal processes
by which options are weighed and decisions made, have changed some-
what over the past handful of decades. Much of this evolution is attributa-
ble to new ocean uses brought on by advancing technology in the post-
5. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
6. Seep. 11.
7. E.g., G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969)
(purporting to impose moratorium on deep seabed mining); G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28), at 24, U.N. Do. A/8028 (1970) (declaration of common heritage principles).
8. P.14.
9. The term is used by Secretary Malone in describing the U.S. situation. See Speech by James L.
Malone, supra note 4.
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World War II period, 10 but perhaps more is attributable to other events
and to the changing self-perception of the United States role in global
affairs." The United States entered the Second World War as a middle-
level power that, when it had addressed ocean issues, had done so with
emphasis on its coastal nation status. It emerged from the war as a major
power with a global orientation. As Hollick stresses, the two Truman
Proclamations-viewed widely as the beginning of the recent upheaval in
the law of the sea '-2 -are products of the transitional period. As such,
"[t]he proclamations embody both the coastal and the global
perspectives."' 3
The first Truman Proclamation,1 4 while explicitly leaving untouched
the traditional freedom of navigation on the high seas, claimed for the
United States the natural resources of the underlying continental shelves
adjacent to United States coasts. The second proclamation"5 did not go
even this far, but seemed to assert United States competence over certain
fishing activities in the high seas near United States shores; again the
newly emergent naval power was careful to preserve freedom of naviga-
tion as a general high seas principle. 6
The Truman Proclamations were, of course, really "Roosevelt Procla-
mations," having been developed during the Roosevelt years and coming
only months after FDR's death. It is fascinating to learn that, had Frank-
lin Roosevelt had his way, the United States might have claimed, for vari-
ous purposes, jurisdiction extending "halfway across the oceans." 7
The Truman Proclamations are often cited as precedents for the 200-
mile zones claimed by South American nations in subsequent years. 8
Hollick reports again, as she did in an earlier comment," that a more
direct precedent for the 200-mile assertions-and that, in fact, relied upon
10. Pp. 9-10, 175-87. See also Jacobson, Future Fisheries Technology and the Law of the Sea, in
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 51-92 (H. Knight ed. 1975).
11. E.g., pp. 18-61; Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L.
23 (1976).
12. This is especially true with respect to the trend toward expanded coastal state jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Young, The Over-Extension of the Continental Shelf, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 454 (1953); T.
Wolff, Peruvian-United States Relations Over Maritime Fishing. 1945-1969 (March 1970) (Occa-
sional Paper No. 4, Law of the Sea Institute).
13. P. 18.
14. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
15. Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (1945).
16. "The character as high seas of the areas in which such conservation zones are established and
the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected." Id. at 12,304. A similar
statement appeared in the first Truman Proclamation, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945), with respect to
waters above the continental shelf.
17. P. 29. Roosevelt was thinking specifically of naval oil reserves, but Japanese fishing in the
North Pacific off Alaska was also a concern. See, e.g., pp. 34-35.
18. See, e.g., Young, supra note 12; T. Wolff, supra note 12.
19. Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977).
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by the first of such claims, Chile's in 1947 20-was the 1939 Declaration of
Panama.2' This declaration, which purported to establish neutrality zones
in most of the waters adjacent to the American continents, was, like the
later Truman Proclamations, attributable to United States initiative:
The defense zone which was proposed by the United States and
agreed to in this declaration extended 300 miles and more from
shore. President Roosevelt personally delimited the connecting
straight lines of the zone which extended the defense area well be-
yond 300 miles in some areas.2 2
Hollick establishes, then, that the rash of expansive coastal nation juris-
dictional and territorial sea claims during the 1950's and 1960's, which
were so abhorrent to predominant United States foreign policy interests in
the post-war period, were actually the flowering of seeds planted by the
United States during its middle-power years when near-shore interests
were considered more important. In light of this background, it is perhaps
fitting that the United States's own 200-mile claim, asserted by the Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,23 finally ensured the in-
ternational customary law validity of the 200-mile resource zone.24
In the meantime, though, the United States took other steps that helped
to shape the UNCLOS III dilemma now perceived by the Reagan Ad-
ministration. For it was the United States, in its role as the foremost naval
power, that saw the threat of "creeping jurisdiction" so vividly in the
1960's that it promoted several of the very sins it now bemoans. During
the 1960's and 70's, four presidential administrations, two Republican
and two Democratic, clearly shared a bipartisan concern for preserving
the broadest freedom of ocean navigation. Consider, for example, the fol-
lowing response to the anguished question of why the United States ever
agreed to participate in the Third U.N. Conference:
The decision to convene a Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference
found its antecedents in the negotiations on territorial sea, straits,
and fisheries matters. These negotiations began in 1967 at the initia-
20. Id. at 498-99.
21. P. 20.
22. Id.
23. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (Supp. 1980). The FCMA claimed for exclusive U.S. manage-
ment, inter alia, a "fishery conservation zone" extending to 200 miles from shore. Id. § 1811.
24. In 1976, less than a majority of coastal nations claimed 200-mile offshore zones; this quickly
changed to a majority after the FCMA and the similar Soviet 200-mile claim. Now even Japan, and
close to 90 other nations, assert 200-mile offshore zones of one sort or another. See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS No. 36, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTIONS (4th
rev. ed. 1981). Customary international law, established by the practices of nation states, certainly
recognizes today the validity of the common-core claim to exclusive fisheries management.
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tive of the United States and the Soviet Union. The two maritime
powers were eager to see international agreement on a twelve-mile
territorial sea if freedom of navigation through straits covered by a
twelve-mile territorial sea were guaranteed ...
After two and a half years of discussions, the United States and
Soviet Governments agreed to begin actively promoting an early in-
ternational conference to deal only with territorial sea issues.2
The two maritime powers' concern with navigation rights through and
over international straits was the result of the failure of the 1958 and
1960 U.N. Law of the Sea Conferences to resolve the issue.2 It soon be-
came clear, however, that a new, third conference would have to take into
account the growing ocean demands, mainly by Third World nations,
regarding fisheries off their coasts.27 In addition, the seabed question,
under the new "common heritage of mankind" banner, was not to be ig-
nored in any new law of the sea conference.28
Now, in 1982, it is the emerging resolution of that seabed question, as
proposed in the Third Conference's Draft Convention, that most concerns
the United States administration. 29 Yet, again, much of the responsibility
for the shape and even the particulars of the Draft Convention's deep
seabed regime rests with United States foreign policy. The basic structure
of the draft treaty's International Seabed Authority finds its source in a
1970 Nixon Administration proposal. 0 That proposal was, in many re-
spects, such a generous concession to Third World "common heritage"
demands that, had the current U.N. Conference adopted it outright,
United States opposition to the draft treaty might even be more vociferous.
For example, the international common heritage area in the Nixon propo-
sal began at the 200-meter isobath, a boundary far shoreward of that
found in the UNCLOS III draft treaty provisions. The Nixon initiative
was, of course, designed to protect the nation's primary concern with the
"creeping jurisdiction" threat to free navigation. The Nixon proposal,
while thereafter providing the basis for seabed negotiations in the new
conference, was rejected by developing nations largely because it was a
United States proposal. That rejection has been, in fact, the cause of some
25. P. 234.
26. See generally pp. 126-95.
27. Pp. 235-36.
28. Pp. 237-39.
29. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 4; Moore, supra note 4; Speech by
James L. Malone, supra note 4.
30. The proposal was in the form of a draft treaty on the seabed. Hollick's description of how this
strange document was developed within the Nixon Administration is found in Chapter 7. See also
Comment, The Nixon Proposal for an International Seabed Authority, 50 OR. L. REV. 599 (1971).
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private regret among Third World negotiators.
Not only the basic structure, but also some of the objectionable specifics
in the Draft Convention's seabed provisions are attributable to the United
States and to the only direct intervention by a United States Secretary of
State in the conference negotiations. In 1976, Secretary Kissinger
presented several concessions that the United States would be willing to
make in exchange for guaranteed access by states and private parties to
deep seabed minerals:
The first concern was that an international Enterprise would be
given the right to mine the seabed under equal conditions. The sec-
ond was that each prospective miner was to propose two sites to the
[International Seabed Authority], one of which could be reserved for
mining by the Enterprise or by developing countries. In addition,
revenues would be generated for the poorest countries based either
on royalties or on a system of profit sharing. [Further,] Kissinger
proposed that incentives should be established for private companies
to share technology with and train personnel from developing coun-
tries that wanted to mine the seabed . . . . He [also] indicated U.S.
willingness to agree to a means of financing the Enterprise so that it
could begin mining concurrently with states. To this end he reiter-
ated United States willingness to transfer mining technology. And, as
a further inducement, he proposed periodic review conferences where
the mining system might be reexamined. A final area in which Kis-
singer made new proposals was on limiting production of seabed
minerals."
Once again the United States, this time in the person of Henry Kissinger,
was planting the very seeds that would grow into the weeds it finds so
odious today: the "parallel system," whereby the Enterprise competes
with private miners, financed by the United States and other industrial-
ized nations; the "compulsory" transfer of mining technology to the En-
terprise and developing countries; seabed mineral production controls in
favor of land-based producers of the same minerals; and periodic review
conferences. 2 What Kissinger was attempting to do in 1976 was to ensure
the successful conclusion of a law of the sea treaty that would include
non-seabed provisions (especially those on navigation and overflight) al-
ready negotiated favorably for other United States interests and that
would still allow access for United States miners to seabed minerals. "Un-
fortunately," Hollick notes, "the practice of bestowing concessions on the
opposing side simply increased the appetite for more United States conces-
31. P. 356.
32. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 4; Moore, supra note 4; Speech by
James L. Malone, supra note 4.
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sions without evoking a corresponding response from the coastal states or
[the developing countries]."33 By 1976, however, this Third World trick
should not have been surprising.
The point of reviewing, through Ann Hollick's book, the heavy United
States role in bringing about the elements of the "dilemma" perceived by
the Reagan Administration is to demonstrate not just that it hardly lies in
the mouth of the United States to complain too loudly about the Draft
Convention (a good case to the contrary can be made), but that the
"United States attitude" toward the Law of the Sea Conference and its
proposed treaty is not necessarily that of the people who happen to be
now in charge. Nor is it that of the people who happen now to have the
closest access to the people in charge. To revert to the elephant metaphor:
a sighted person viewing the whole law of the sea animal in its natural
setting should not conclude that the United States is clearly a loser in the
UNCLOS III process. Maybe it has not won, but neither has it lost. Like
everyone else, it has compromised.
In assessing the accuracy of this proposition, one must take into account
some important realities, including the following:
(1) Third World nations exist and are treated by international law as
sovereign, equal, and independent, due in large measure to United States-
led efforts to end colonialism through the United Nations system;34
(2) The United States has an important stake in virtually every ocean
activity, from the traditional uses of the sea for navigation and fishing to
the most advanced resource-recovery activities. The United States is not
just a one-dimensional seabed mining power or even just a maritime
power. It is both of these, but it is also a coastal nation with vast and
valuable offshore resources, 3 and it thus shares many ocean interests with
developing coastal nations; 36
33. P. 359.
34. This reality, now that some in the industrialized North have come to dislike it, does not mean
that the U.S. should seriously consider boycotting one-nation-one-vote fora on the ground that we are
actually more powerful and important than small, poor nations. In fact, U.S. influence and power are
still considerable in today's international arenas, as demonstrated by UNCLOS III. What developing
nation could have put the whole conference virtually on hold for a year while it considered its law of
the sea options? (As is true in one-person-one-vote national democracies, some voters vote "heavier"
than others.) Yet it can be conceded that the U.S. might have used its real influence to its own better
advantage in the conference. See pp. 377-81.
35. The U.S. fishery conservation zone includes over two million square miles and contains fifteen
to twenty percent of the world's traditionally harvested fishery resources. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., CALENDAR YEAR 1979 REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 1 (1980).
36. For example, the U.S. shares with developing coastal nations the following interests, among
others: an interest in conserving and managing coastal fisheries and the economic and social health of
coastal fishing communities; an interest in developing offshore mineral resources; an interest in na-
tional security threats in offshore waters; an interest in observing and participating in foreign scientific
research in and under those waters; the interest in preventing offshore pollution.
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(3) The priorities within this array of United States ocean interests
shift over time, often because of observable shifts in national interests but
just as often because of changes in the people and processes by which one
interest or another is promoted to the national decisionmakers;"
(4) Nevertheless (that is, despite (3) but because of (2)), a stable and
uniform law of the sea regime-or set of regimes-is clearly in the United
States's general interest;
(5) Such a stable, uniform law of the sea regime probably cannot exist
in today's world without something like UNCLOS III."
In view of these realities, a case can be made for the proposition that
the United States is not faring so badly as a result of its participation in
UNCLOS III, even while admitting that it might have fared better and
could still fare better in the final-stage negotiations. To make that case,
one must compare the UNCLOS III Draft Convention scheme-in all
major areas of United States interest-with international ocean law as it
would be (or will be) otherwise. Such a project involves, of course, much
guesswork, albeit educated guesswork, and nothing like a full-scale analy-
sis can be attempted in the present format. Nevertheless, the following
suggestions are offered.
I Navigation and Overflight. It is clearly important to the United States,
if no longer absolutely vital, that naval and air mobility remain as un-
restricted as possible, especially through and over international straits.
United States passion for this national interest has apparently diminished
from the time when it formed the core of our early UNCLOS III strategy,
partly due to the increased range of our submarine fleet's missiles and the
consequent decrease in the importance of submerged straits passage.3' But
it is still a high priority. Commercial mobility at sea is also at stake and in
the United States's interest. In these regards, United States negotiators in
the Third Conference have basically achieved what they set out to do: the
Draft Convention will preserve high seas navigation and overflight free-
37. As Hollick states:
When one looks beneath the label "U.S. government" to discover the agency and interest group
actors that determine national policy, the source of the discontinuity in policy becomes intelligi-
ble. A host of incompatible and self-interested coastal and distant-water concerns are vying
constantly to determine national policy. On any given set of issues one side may prevail; then
the other may win the next policy victory.
P. 374.
38. In fact, much of the criticism aimed at UNCLOS III today maintains that such a regime
cannot exist even with a new UNCLOS III treaty. E.g., Gamble, Where Trends the Law of the Sea?
10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 61 (1981). This may indeed be the ultimate reality facing UNCLOS III,
but it does not by any means establish that the U.S. or the international community would be better
off without the treaty.
39. Hollick also blames a U.S. return to "a more limited view of its capabilities in the wake of the
Vietnam War, growing Soviet power, and the dispersion of economic power to Japan and Western
Europe." P. 12. See also pp. 240-389 (chapters 8-10).
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doms in 200-mile exclusive economic zones,4' and it will establish transit
passage rights through and over international straits 41 and archipelagic
waters.4 1 Without UNCLOS III, the United States would have great diffi-
culty maintaining these freedoms and rights in the face of emerging cus-
tomary law trends toward restricting navigation within the expanding
zones of coastal nation jurisdictions. 3
Fishing. As the nation with the world's longest coastline and with some
of the world's richest ocean fisheries off its shores, the United States bene-
fits from the extended jurisdiction trend insofar as that jurisdiction encom-
passes exclusive management of fisheries. The Draft Convention will cod-
ify the right of the United States and other coastal nations to manage
fisheries within their 200-mile exclusive economic zones.4 4 Admittedly,
this right has already been established as a matter of customary law, but
it can hardly be denied that: (1) the UNCLOS III negotiations created an
international political climate that hastened the customary law develop-
ment; and (2) the new treaty could at least impose some uniformity on the
messy inconsistencies of the current claims.45
Continental Shelf Immense and resource-rich lands extend undersea
from the United States continent. Much to the outrage of certain groups
in the United States, the 1970 Nixon proposal for an International Seabed
Resource Authority would have assigned most of these lands to the inter-
national common heritage. To the satisfaction of these same groups, the
UNCLOS III draft treaty will instead establish that the resources of vir-
tually the entire continental margin (shelf, slope and rise, down to the
deep seabed) are under coastal state jurisdiction. 46 As in the case of the
40. See U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea,
arts. 58, 86-115, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.78 (1981), at 22, 35-43 [hereinafter cited by article
number only].
41. Arts. 34-45. Unfortunately, these articles have interpretation difficulties that will probably
present some problems for the U.S. in the future. See Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1980); Reisman, The
Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 48 (1980).
42. Arts. 46-54.
43. See Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 902 (1980).
44. Arts. 55-75. Also in the U.S. interest is the general prohibition on fishing for salmon in the
high seas beyond the exclusive economic zone. Art. 66. The FCMA, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882
(Supp. 1980), asserts exclusive U.S. management and enforcement jurisdiction over U.S.-source
salmon beyond 200 miles, but this claim is almost certainly not consistent with general international
law. See Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts Between a Future Law of the Sea Treaty and the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 451, 490 nn.206-07 (1977).
The draft treaty would present obstacles, however, to U.S. distant water fishermen. They are a
minority of U.S. fishermen, but an economically important minority. See Art. 64.
45. Current claims range from mere assertion of management authority for fisheries to 200-mile
territorial sea claims. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 24; Burke, National Legislation
on Ocean Authority Zones and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 289
(1981).
46. Arts. 76-85. In fact, because the draft treaty's "continental shelf" extends a minimum of 200
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fishing interest, it can be argued that UNCLOS III, if not necessary to
achieve this result, helped speed up the process and can provide some de-
sirable uniformity.
Scientific Research. As a preeminent oceanographic nation, the United
States should rightly bemoan the fact that recent trends in the law of the
sea-both within and outside the UNCLOS III proceedings-have led to
severe assaults on the freedom of scientific research in the oceans.4 ' Yet
again, however, these trends are part of the general trend toward more
extensive coastal nation jurisdiction. Without an UNCLOS III treaty, this
trend would undoubtedly lead to a claim pattern supporting complete con-
trol by coastal nations over ocean research within 200 miles from shore.
The proposed treaty, while establishing a "consent regime" in favor of
coastal jurisdiction over the conduct of oceanographic research within ex-
clusive economic zones.4" Consequently, the scientific community in the
United States now generally favors the Draft Convention over any likely
alternative legal regime.4
Marine Pollution. As already noted, the United States is a naval and
maritime power. Many people in the United States, however, are also
strongly in favor of protecting and preserving the marine environment,
especially off United States shores. The result has been a schizophrenic
United States approach to the question of how much jurisdiction interna-
tional law should allow to coastal nations to control polluting activities
within the exclusive economic zones. Too little local control, and the
marine environment could suffer; too much local control, and freedom of
navigation could suffer. The draft treaty provides a carefully negotiated
compromise that is not entirely satisfactory to either interest. 0 Further-
more, it does not come to grips with ocean pollution from sources on land.
But without a widely acceptable international treaty, an unwieldy kalei-
doscope of claims and conflicts over marine pollution problems could re-
sult, despite the efforts of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization and the U.N. Environment Programme.'
Marine Mammals. The United States is one of the few actors on the
international stage to take any special interest in the preservation of
nautical miles from shore, some deep seabed areas will be included within national jurisdiction. See
art. 76.
47. See, e.g., Science, Technology, and Ocean Development, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 187-333
(1981) (special symposium) [hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIUM].
48. Arts. 238-265; Jacobson, Marine Scientific Research Under Emerging Ocean Law, in SYMPO-
SlUM, supra note 47, at 187; Mangone, The Effect of Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction Over the
Seas and Seabed Upon Marine Coastal Science Research, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 47, at 201.
49. See Wooster, Research in Troubled Waters: U.S. Research Vessel Clearance Experience,
1972-1978, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 47, at 219.
50. Arts. 192-237.
51. See Burke, supra note 45, at 311.
Vol. 91: 842, 1982
Sea Changes
marine mammals, again because of the large numbers of United States
citizens promoting that interest. As a result, the Draft Convention con-
tains a special article-weak, but nevertheless there-furthering the cause
of mammal protection.12 Perhaps the plight of whales and other sea mam-
mals will be no less precarious with the treaty in place, but no general
protective principle is likely to exist without it.
Dispute Settlement. The United States has led the laudable UNCLOS
III fight for inclusion in the new treaty of a comprehensive system for
compulsory settlement of ocean law disputes between nations. The result-
ing provisions of the Draft Convention53 are a disappointment when com-
pared with the ideal goal; many important disputes will not be subject to
compulsory settlement. Nevertheless, when viewed from an historical per-
spective, the treaty provisions are a creditable success. A special Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea will be established to augment the
International Court of Justice and arbitration tribunals; and where com-
pulsory settlement is not required, the Draft Convention generally pro-
vides for compulsory conciliation. Of course, no such dispute settlement
regime can exist without a treaty.
Deep Seabed Mining. This difficult subject has been saved until last so
that it may be viewed in broad perspective. As the foregoing discussion
illustrates, deep seabed mining is just one among many United States
ocean interests. At the moment it is being touted to United States deci-
sionmakers as the most important United States interest. This is not nec-
essarily true.
The deep seabed beyond 200 miles is international space. No one today
seriously disagrees. But the old idea that international law should allow
minerals of the seabed-even "strategic" minerals"-to be taken freely by
those who got there first with the necessary technology is simply unrealis-
tic. Even the loosely analogous freedom-to-fish rule, to which the Western
world paid lip service from the time of Grotius, lasted only until the post-
World War II development of large distant-water fishing fleets. Because
of the 200-mile zones, most commercial fish are no longer free for the
taking, and the minerals of the deep seabed will almost inevitably suffer a
similar fate. Indeed, one of the likely effects of the international commu-
nity's failure to devise an accomodation of interests on the seabed would
be vastly extended coastal nation claims to seabed areas, along the pattern
52. Art. 120.
53. Arts. 279-299, annexes V-VIII.
54. See, e.g., Statement of Theodore G. Kronmiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and International and Environmental and Scientific Affairs, before the American Mining
Congress Mining Convention, Denver, Colo. (Sept. 30, 1981). These "strategic" miner-
als-manganese, copper, cobalt, and nickel-were somehow not considered so strategic when the U.S.
made its earlier plans for UNCLOS III negotiations.
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of the earlier 200-mile claims."
This is not to say the United States should automatically approve the
accomodation that has been worked out so far in the UNCLOS proceed-
ings. The United States should negotiate for removal of or improvement
in those elements of the proposed seabed regime that are most objectiona-
ble. 6 Beyond achieving such improvements, the United States must face
the finally adopted UNCLOS III treaty and make its decision. It can view
the objectionable portions of the seabed regime-and there will still be
some, even with brilliant last-phase negotiating victories for the United
States-as the price to be paid for the gains made elsewhere in the agree-
ment. 7 On the other hand, the United States can take a hard look at
alternatives to the treaty: The alternative with respect to seabed minerals,
assuming the other mining states will not become parties to the UNCLOS
convention, might be a "mini-treaty" among the mining states, who will
be beset by Third World pressures to curtail such other ocean activities as
straits passage and marine scientific research.
Very recent developments in UNCLOS III, however, indicate that a
United States refusal to participate in a new treaty will prevent neither
the adoption of the treaty by the conference nor the eventual participation
by virtually every other member of the world community, including other
seabed mining countries. The result, therefore, even without United States
participation, will be the effective establishment of an International Sea-
bed Authority; furthermore, United States mining companies would apply
for and receive ISA licenses under the sponsorship of treaty nations who
will continue to be members of international ocean mining consortia. The
United States would thus be deprived of treaty benefits with few compen-
sating advantages other than the satisfaction of having held on to its ideo-
logical purity in the face of the UNCLOS III attack on the free enterprise
philosophy.
All in all, then, I think Ann Hollick teaches us that serious United
States disappointment over the directions taken by UNCLOS III is not
well-founded. Many of our national ocean interests have clearly been en-
55. The "precedent" for such a move might already have been established, again by the U.S. In
1980, Congress enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1473
(Supp. 1981), which authorizes a procedure for licensing U.S. miners to mine the deep seabed beyond
national jurisdiction. Although the act is labeled as "interim" and carefully limits its effects to U.S.
nationals and companies only and makes no territorial claims, similarly careful drafting of the 1945
Truman Proclamations did not prevent other nations from citing them as precedents for the 200-mile
zones. See supra TAN 12-18.
56. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 4, at 213-16.
57. Besides, even from a U.S. perspective, the proposed deep seabed regime is not all bad, espe-
cially when compared with alternatives and with analogous mining concession rules now encountered
in many countries. See Katz, A Method for Evaluating the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the
Law of the Sea Treaty, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 114 (1980).
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hanced; others have not, but this has not been entirely unplanned or un-
bargained for by the United States. In today's world, no single nation can
expect to have its cake and eat it too. Any expectation to the contrary is
not just unrealistic; it might also be dangerous.
Whatever the outcome of the Third Conference, the long period of con-
fusion in the law of the sea is far from over. The Conference may fail to
adopt a treaty,"8 or the treaty it adopts may never come into force, or the
treaty may never receive the large number of ratifications and accessions
necessary for it to become a meaningful legal document, 9 or it too may be
overtaken by time and events and become irrelevant. The uncertainties
will last for at least several more years, and the United States role will be,
as usual, crucial. It will continue to be a fascinating process to observe,
and one much in need of analysis and explanation. Amid the confusion,
we can optimistically entertain the hope that Ann Hollick's United States
Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea will someday be labeled Volume
One in a most valuable set.
58. On April 30, 1982, just as this Review was going to press, the Conference adopted a new
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Conference vote was 130 in favor, 4 against, with 17 absten-
tions. The United States was among the four delegations that voted against the treaty. See Los Ange-
les Times, May 1, 1982, at 1, col. 1. The United States vote reflects the Reagan administration's
views; but a subsequent administration might, of course, sign the new treaty and submit it to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification.
59. Sixty ratifications or accessions will be required before the new treaty becomes binding. Art.
308.

